Mindel Scott

Legal Fiction Corporate Personhood

But given that the current Supreme Court is often cited as the most business-friendly in history,37×37. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1431–32 (2013); see also Matthew Goldstein, Brett Kavanaugh Likely to Bring Pro-Business Views to Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (July 10, 2018), nyti.ms/2KQkOdJ [perma.cc/J8SW-4WF8]. It seems unlikely that a tactical change would deceive the judges. A better solution to the problems sparked by Citizens United, which does not depend on the court, might be for reformers on the street to pursue a more radical view of Romney`s own understanding of affairs. Romney was right that corporations are literally “groups of people”38×38.

Rucker, op. cit. cit., note 28, A2 (citing Romney). : Institutions whose rules govern how shareholders, employees, directors, officers, creditors, consumers and other groups may represent themselves and exercise power.39×39. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner v. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 138–40 (1933); Louis D. Brandeis, Other People`s Money and How the Bankers Use It 7-8 (1914). Outside the corporate context, we call these kinds of representative and power-balancing institutions of governments. And even in the corporate context, companies are often referred to as “corporate democracies”40×40.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (cited Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794). : a form of government in which elected directors theoretically express the will of their constituents.41×41. Id.; see also Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 Yale L.J. 1477, 1489 (1958) (review by J.A. Livingston, The American Stockholder (1958)). Significantly, even some factory managers accepted that if they did not want workers to take control of their industries by force, they had to give workers a voice in company decision-making.

In the bulletin of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, John Bruce McPherson partly blamed Lawrence`s strike as “those manufacturers who did not at present encourage or oppose the organization of regular unions, one of the organized conservative forces of the country, of their subordinates.” 164×164. John Bruce McPherson, The Lawrence Strike of 1912, 42 Bull. Nat`l Ass`n Wool Manufacturers 219, 250 (1912); See ID. 263–65. He argued that “the way to prevent the demagogue from taking control of the workers` movement is not to thwart the organization and refuse to consult local or national officers, but to deal with these officers and encourage these regular organizations.” 165×165. Id., p. 264. Other factory managers, meanwhile, pointed out that corporations were already industrial democracies because ordinary people owned shares and voted to elect corporate boards.166×166 See, for example, Bureau of Labor, op. cit. cit., note 144, p. 40 (statement by William M. Wood, President of American Woolen Co.).

Like the company`s lawyers in Winkler`s account, these company directors claimed that they already represented the interests of the workers.167×167. “I am an employee of the company like you,” William Wood of the American Woolen Company said in a statement to the strikers.168×168. adequately protect the interests of 13,000 shareholders. Many of them are employees, and most of them. are not rich. Many of them necessarily depend on their dividends for their living expenses, just as you depend on your salary for yours. “169×169. The editors of The Protectionist magazine added: “In the depressing agitation against our great industry, every page is painted brightly against the company and its pro-aid executives.” 170×170. Shareholders` Rights, 23 The Protectionist 711, 711 (1912). But “not a word is heard in favor of as many shareholders as workers, men and women, who in very many cases. deserve important consideration, for what they receive in dividends provides bread and butter as much as the agent`s wages provide the necessities of life.

171×171. Ders. EIB 711–12. Under Indian law, companies, governing bodies, etc. and several other non-human rights have been granted the status of “legal persons”. In lawsuits involving corporations, shareholders are not liable for the company`s debts, but the company itself, as a “legal entity”, is obliged to repay those debts or be sued for non-repayment of debts. Non-human entities that are legally designated as “corporations” “have ancillary rights and obligations; They can sue and be sued, can own and transfer property.” Because these non-human entities are “voiceless,” they are legally represented “by guardians and agents” to assert their legal rights and fulfill their legal duties and responsibilities. Specific non-human entities with the status of “legal entity” include “legal personality, body politic, non-profit trade unions, etc.”, as well as trusts, deities, temples, churches, mosques, hospitals, universities, colleges, banks, railways, municipalities and gram panchayats (village councils), rivers, all animals and birds. [4] How did we get here? Unlike other historians who have answered this question by referring to state courts, legislation, corruption, advertising, and business innovation,59×59. See, for example, Charles F. Adams, Jr. & Henry Adams, Chapters of Erie, and Other Essays 332–429 (Boston, James R.

Osgood & Co. 1871) ; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand 285–314, 455–500 (1977); Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 129-39 (3. Auflage, 2005); Horwitz, a. a. O., Fußnote 36, S. 111–14 ; James Willard, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780–1970, p. 58–154 (1970); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904, pp. 1–13, 159–94 (1985); Ralph L.

Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895–1956, pp. 5–7, 33–40 (1959); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Beginnings of « Big Business » in American Industry, 33 Bus. Hist. Rev. 1, 10-14 (1959); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 Geo. L.J. 1593, 1640–49 (1988). Siehe allgemein Ronald Seavoy, Les origines de l’American Business Corporation, 1784-1855 (1982).

Natürlich haben nicht alle Unternehmen diesen Übergang vollzogen; Kommunale Körperschaften wurden in dieser Zeit noch stärker reguliert. Siehe Gerald E. Frug, City Making 32-53 (1999); Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law, 1730–1870, pp. 179–258 (1983). Even today, some for-profit corporations are so closely associated with their founding government that constitutional limits also apply to society. See for example Dep`t of Transp. Ass`n of Am. R.Rs., 135 pp. Ct.

1225, 1228 (2015) (via Amtrak); Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 103 A.3d 249, 251 (N.J. 2014) (deals with the owner of a high-rise building). Winkler`s book focuses exclusively on arguments before the Supreme Court (p. xviii). While this guidance may seem a bit narrow-minded to non-lawyers, it allows Winkler to correct a misconception that has been prevalent since the Year of the Legal Entity – about how lawyers have obtained constitutional rights for corporations. But a note from the court reporter in the title of the decision went even further. Although another private memo from the chief justice stated that the court had deliberately avoided the issue of constitutional protections for corporations, the journalist chose to make his own addition to the files.

He noted that the court ruled that corporations are individuals within the meaning of the 14th Amendment and, as such, are subject to the same legal protections as any other [source: Hartmann]. A central point of discussion in recent years has been the role that corporate money plays and should play in democratic politics. This is part of the broader debate about campaign finance reform and the role money can play in politics. Consistent with the reasoning of Dartmouth College and other precedents (see US jurisprudence below), corporations could exercise the rights of their shareholders, and shareholders were entitled to some of the legal protection against arbitrary government action.